We model a banker's future bonuses as a series of call options on the bank's profits and show that bonus caps and deferrals reduce risk-taking. However, the banker's optimal risk-taking also depends on the costs of risk-taking. We calibrate the model to US banking data and show that lengthening the standard one-year bonus payment interval has no material impact, whereas capping the bonus at the level of the base salary substantially reduces the bankers risk-taking. Our results suggest that the European Union's bonus cap reduces risk-taking whereas bonus clawbacks as prescribed in the Dodd-Frank Act appear to be ineffective.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis that started in 2007, bankers' compensation has become a major issue both for banks' corporate governance and regulation. The main question is whether large short-term bonuses spurred too much risk-taking that partly caused the crisis. For instance, Rajan (2005) , who foresaw some of the key developments that eventually led to the crisis, emphasizes the role of short-term compensation. In response to the compensation concerns, both regulators and banks themselves have started to take restrictive measures on compensation. 1 Our contribution in this paper is two-fold. First, we develop a theoretical model for the value of a banker's future cash bonuses and her bonus-induced risk-taking incentives, which depend on the size of the bonuses and the bonus payment frequency. In the model the bonus size and the bonus frequency can be constrained by a regulatory bonus cap and deferral. Second, using data on US banks we calibrate the theoretical model and simulate the effect of the bonus cap and the bonus deferral on the bankers' risk-taking.
We find that the effect of bonus deferral on the bankers' risk-taking is immaterial unless bonuses are originally paid more frequently than once a year, but a cap on bonuses can substantially reduce the risk-taking. To keep the model simple, we focus on cash bonuses as a form of short-term compensation. However, since an important part of the bankers' compensation is in the form of stock and stock option grants, we take them into account in the model calibration. In the model we take the bankers' compensation as given, hence abstracting away from the incentives of shareholders, and then analyze the effect of compensation on the banker's risk-taking with and without the bonus restrictions. In other words, we focus on counterfactual analysis.
More specifically, we evaluate bankers' risk-taking changes due to 1) a bonus cap and 2) a longer bonus determination interval (i.e., a bonus deferral), which some jurisdictions, notably the US and the EU are already in the process of implementing in some form.
Using a standard continuous-time asset pricing framework we first derive the theoretical value of a banker's expected future cash bonus stream, assuming no bonus cap or bonus deferral (beyond the standard one-year bonus determination interval). With this baseline model we measure the banker's risk-taking incentive by the derivative of the present value of the bonuses with respect to the bank's earnings volatility. As bonuses are only paid out of positive profits, they are like call options and, hence, the present value of future bonuses is a series of sequential call options on the bank's earnings. Further, since the call options are convex with respect to the earnings, the banker would prefer to increase the earnings volatility as much as possible by raising leverage or by buying riskier assets if there were no costs to do that. However, in practice markets, regulators, other forms of compensation such as equity, and banks themselves set constraints and costs in risktaking and we add these to our baseline model in a stylized manner as explained later in this section.
We obtain three key theoretical results. First, we show that the series of cash bonuses is worth more, the shorter the time interval between bonus determination points. Intuitively, this result is related to Merton (1973) who shows that a portfolio of options on individual stocks is worth more than an option on the basket consisting of those stocks. However, the analogy in our case is to compare the value of a certain number of sequential bonuses, each interpreted as an option on earnings over a fixed time interval, with the value of one bonus which is an option on earnings over the entire time horizon spanned by the time periods of the sequential bonuses. Our theoretical result suggests that bankers (and similarly, e.g., hedge fund and private equity managers) have a strong incentive to negotiate compensation contracts with short payment horizons. 2 In the hedge fund industry, the effect on risk-taking incentives of short payment horizons can be at Second, we show that the shorter the bonus determination interval, the higher is the banker's risk-taking incentive in terms of increasing the earnings volatility. Although our model does not generate any predictions about how the terms of a banker's compensation contract are determined, this result is important because it formalizes the common notion that short-term bonus contracts spur risk-taking. 3 An immediate corollary of the result is that imposing a bonus deferral can help contain risk-taking.
Third, we show that bonus cap decreases the value of future bonuses and the risktaking incentive by cutting the "upside" of a bonus above the threshold defined by the cap. More precisely, the bonus cap can be modeled as a short call option on profits with an exercise price determined by the bonus cap rule. As a result, our baseline model for the present value of the banker's future cash bonus stream is augmented by a series of short calls, representing the bonus caps on the future bonus payments.
To do the policy simulations for the effect of bonus regulations on bankers' risktaking we incorporate the cost of risk-taking in the model. The cost of risk-taking may stem from several sources, e.g., from complying with current capital and liquidity regulations, market discipline, risk culture of the bank, other compensation components such as equity, and the cost of additional effort. Moreover, an obvious cost of too much risk-taking is due to the possibility that the banker loses her job as a result of poor performance or, ultimately, the bankruptcy of the bank. However, we do not consider these cost elements explicitly; instead, since the risk-taking constraints and costs are not fully observed, we model the cost of changing the earnings volatility with both piecewise linear and piecewise quadratic cost functions. Then for robustness we analyze the effects of bonus caps and bonus deferrals under both of the cost function cases. By balancing the least partially controlled by the so called high-water marks (see e.g. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) ). 3 See e.g. Edmans et al. (2012) for a model which derives the optimal level and performancesensitivity of CEO compensation contract. Short-term bonus contracts and their effects are also commonly discussed in financial press (see e.g. Bloomberg, 19 June 2013, "U.K. Banker Bonuses Face Decade Delays in Industry Overhaul").
cost and the banker's risk-taking incentive due to cash bonuses, the banker determines her optimal level of risk-taking. Note that bankers' other forms of compensation such as stock and stock option grants can have both negative and positive effects on the risk-taking, so we implicitly assume that the net effect of these are captured by our cost functions. Further, for robustness we also model the other compensation components explicitly by adding them to cash bonuses and show that our results are qualitatively the same in both settings.
We calibrate the parameters of the cost functions empirically in the context of the baseline model, excluding bonus caps and rules concerning bonus deferrals. Thus, we calibrate the cost functions assuming that compensation regulation is not implemented.
To do that, we use a sample of 78 US banks and data on their balance sheets and Thus, the pre-global financial crisis data should be unaffected by any major expectations concerning possible bonus restrictions, which became a possibility soon after the crisis.
We use the data at the eve of the crisis also because this gives us an idea of how bonus restrictions, had they been introduced then, might have affected the bankers' risk-taking.
In the model calibration we assume that the historically estimated earnings volatility of each bank is at the optimal level for the respective bank CEO. That is, the volatility of each bank maximizes the difference between the bank CEO's bonus value and her cost of risk-taking. By assuming this equilibrium condition at the end of 2006, we get bank-specific cost parameters for both linear and quadratic cost functions. The cost parameters are highly correlated with bank size and bonus induced risk-taking incentive indicating that big banks have more frictions to change their risks and that risk-taking costs and compensation move together. Thus, higher risk-taking frictions e.g. due to a capital regulation could raise the CEOs' bonus-based compensation. With the calibrated model we then run the counterfactual analysis of a bonus cap and bonus deferral for each bank. Regarding the bonus cap we limit the cash bonus to be no greater than the CEO's fixed salary. This case is motivated by the recent EU regulation. 5 We find that on average the bonus cap reduces the banks' earnings volatility by about 23.08% (from 0.0158 to 0.0121) relative to the pre-crisis earnings volatility, but the bank-specific effect varies widely. We find evidence that the bonus cap is most effective on bigger banks. As big banks typically impose biggest systemic risk to the financial system, bonus cap may hence contribute to containing systemic risk.
Regarding the bonus deferral we consider the case where the cash bonus is determined (and paid) every second year, instead of the one-year standard, based on the bank's cumulative profit over the preceding two-year period. 6 By our counterfactual analysis, in this case the bonus deferral has no material effect on the bankers' risk-taking. Even if bonuses were paid only once at the end of the CEO's expected tenure, we would not achieve a nowhere near similar risk reduction impact as with the considered bonus cap which has a sizeable effect on risk-taking. This somewhat surprising result is robust with respect to our earnings volatility estimate and if stock and option grants are added to the cash bonuses. However, we find the effect of the bonus deferral to be nonlinear in such a way that if bonuses were originally paid more frequently than once a year (e.g., semi-annually, quarterly, or monthly) as is the case in some hedge funds, 7 then
5 See Official Journal of the European Union, 27.6.2013, Article 94. 6 See Official Journal of the European Union, 27.6.2013, Article 94(m) which says that "at least 40%, of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years". This rule could be interpreted as producing at minimum an approximately two-year bonus payment deferral. In practice, the amount of bonus may still be determined for each year based on that year's performance but the actual payment is made only after two years. The deferred payment makes it possible to cancel the bonus if, major losses materialize, or, e.g., some wrong-doing is revealed ex post.
7 For instance, investor group AOI recommends that performance fees should be paid no more frequently than once a year, rather than on a monthly or quarterly basis as they are at many hedge funds (see Bloomberg, December 4, 2014, "Hedge Funds Urged to Beat Benchmarks Before Charging Fees", available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-03/hedge-funds-urged-to-beat-6 lengthening of the bonus payment interval would start to have a material impact on risktaking. On balance, our results suggest that the European Union's bonus cap is effective in reining in risk-taking whereas bonus clawbacks included in the US Dodd-Frank Act seem ineffective.
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The paper is organized as follows. After a literature review in Section 2, the model setup is presented in Section 3. The value of the future bonus stream, considering also the effects of bonus caps and bonus deferrals, is derived in Section 4. Section 5 introduces the cost of risk-taking and Section 6 presents the bonus regulation analyses by using the calibrated model. Section 7 concludes.
Literature review
In this section we review the literature on compensation based risk-taking incentives. We then discuss a selection of recent papers which are more directly related to our work from two perspectives, the size and the length of payment horizon in compensation contracts.
There are studies which find that the aggressiveness of managerial compensation does increase risk-taking in corporations (e.g. Coles et al. (2006) and Low (2009) ).
The reason to design such contracts is that managers are inherently too risk averse (e.g. Beatty and Zajec (1994) ) which may, however, depend on the amount and composition of their personal wealth (see Korkeamaki et al. (2013) ). Interestingly, Houston and James (1995) do not find bankers' compensation to promote more risk-taking than in other industries but they note that it is possible that in banks risk-taking incentives can be more hidden. Cain and McKeon (2014) show that risk-taking in corporations depends also on the CEO's personal risk preferences on top of the compensation-based risk-taking incentives.
benchmarks-before-charging-fees.html). 8 We explain at the end of subsection 6.2 how our analysis with bonus deferrals can be applied to bonus clawbacks. The link between bankers' risk-taking incentives and the timing of their compensation is analyzed in several papers. The paper which provides most direct evidence that shorter-term compensation contracts increase risk-taking is by Gopalan et al. (2010) .
Using a carefully constructed measure of executive compensation duration for both financials and non-financials, they show that CEOs with shorter pay durations are more likely to engage in myopic investment behavior. The average CEO pay duration of the 109 US banks in their sample is little more than one year. However, not all papers agree that compensation duration is crucial for bankers' risk-taking; Acharya et al. (2014) show in a theoretical model that the impact of pay duration is minor. Their model is set in the context of a labor market competition for managerial talent. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) show that "(b)anks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis". This is consistent with our model since CEOs' risk-taking incentives are not given only by compensation but also by the cost of risk-taking. More generally, our paper is also related to principal-agent models (see e.g. Grossman and Hart (1983), Holmstrom (1979 Holmstrom ( , 1982 Holmstrom ( , 1983 Holmstrom ( , 1999 ), Milgrom (1991, 1994) , Myerson (1982) , Rogerson (1985) , and Sannikov (2008)). 10 In the present paper, we do not use principal-agent modeling but take the bankers' compensation contract as given and estimate the cost of risk-taking from banks' actions. We then focus on counterfactual analysis of changes in risk-taking due to regulatory changes. Further, in estimating the cost of risk-taking we assume that the benefits and costs of risk-taking are in balance and, therefore, our approach implies that one cannot necessarily make predictions of a bank's risk level and/or performance during the crisis solely on the basis of the compensation contracts the bank offers to its top management, the cost of risk-taking matters as well.
Model
We consider a risk-neutral banker who receives bonuses with certain frequency during There are two assets, a risk-free asset and a risky asset. The risky asset can be viewed as the bank's main business, i.e., its loan portfolio and the risk-free asset as a source of leverage. The bank debt is risk-free in our model and its dynamics is given by
where r is the risk-free rate and r > 0. When the bank borrows money from the market, it sells bonds, i.e., the holding is negative and its borrowing cost is the risk-free rate.
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Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q (for more on risk-neutral pricing see e.g. Duffie (2001)), the risky asset follows
where S(0) > 0, σ is the volatility and it satisfies σ > 0, and W (t) is a standard Wiener process under Q. We denote by {F t } the information filtration generated by the Wiener process. Thus, F t is the information at time t. If the bank's loan portfolio is risky then σ is high. Further, the loan portfolio dynamics are after all operational costs.
The banker selects the fractions invested in the risk-free and risky assets, and after that the bank controls its asset holdings in continuous time in such a way that it keeps the fractions constant. Since the bank uses leverage, it has a negative holding in the risk-free asset. Then it invests all its equity and debt into the risky asset, i.e., into its loan portfolio. Therefore, under the risk-neutral probability measure Q the bank's net portfolio value, i.e., its equity value evolves according to (see e.g. Merton (1971))
where A(t) is the equity value and A(0) > 0, levered volatility σ θ = (1 + θ)σ, and θ is the bank debt relative to the equity value. Thus,
where n B (t) is the bond holding (negative) at time t. This gives n B (t) = −θA(t)/B(t),
i.e., the bank adjusts its borrowing all the time to keep θ constant. For instance, when the equity A(t) falls then the bank borrows less. Note that this model structure implies that the bank cannot go bankrupt since the equity is positive. That is, by the model structure the bank is able to continuously adjust its leverage in response to changes in the equity value (so that θ is constant), and this guarantees that the bank is always able to pay to the bond holders in full.
We analyze how the levered volatility σ θ affects the compensation value. Note again that σ θ rises in θ and σ, i.e., the banker can increase risk by increasing the leverage and/or the risky asset volatility, and here we do not focus on the mechanism how the banker changes σ θ (but clearly there are two ways).
From (1) we get
where t 2 > t 1 and, by the definition of Wiener process, W (0) = 0.
For calculating the banker's compensation, tenure [0, T ] is divided into n equal length intervals, where n is bounded. That is, ∆ = T /n, where ∆ is the length of the intervals.
At the end of each interval, the bank pays a bonus to the banker and the bonus depends on the change of the net asset value during the time period. More specifically, at the end of i'th interval, the bonus payoff is given by
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, where k ∈ (0, 1) and it represents the fraction of profits paid out as compensation to the banker, ∆ is the time interval between the bonus determination points and n∆ = T , so n is the bonus frequency. Thus, at the end of each time interval the bank pays bonus to the banker if the net asset value has risen. Further, we assume that the banker's compensation is so small relative to the net assets that we can ignore its effect on the net asset dynamics (see Table 1 and the statistics for k there).
For example, if n = 1 then we have just one payoff and this happens at time T :
Value of the compensation
In this section we first analyze how the bonus frequency affects the compensation value and the banker's risk-taking incentives. More specifically, in Section 4.1 we model the incentives given the asset dynamics (1) and the bonuses (3). After that we extend the model to include a bonus cap in Section 4.2.
Let us define the following Black and Scholes (1973) call option price with strike price K:
is standard normal density,
Thus, C(∆, K) is ∆-maturity European call option on
with strike price K. Our model can be extended to more complicated asset processes, such as a jump diffusion process for the assets (see e.g. Kou (2002)), and then this would change the pricing of C(∆, K) and the rest of our analysis would be the same.
Compensation value without bonus cap
By the risk-neutral pricing and (3), the present value of the banker's compensation package is given by
Thus, the compensation package is a sequence of call option contracts. The number of contracts in the sequence depends on ∆. For instance, if ∆ = T then π 1 equals one call option with maturity date T . By (5) and iterated expectation, we get the following result.
Proposition 1
The value of the compensation package with n payout periods on [0, T ] is given by
where C(T /n, 1) is the call option price (4), k is the fraction of profits paid out as compensation, and A(0) is the initial net asset value.
Proof: By (5) and iterated expectation, we get
Thus, the value of the compensation equals nkA(0) many call options with maturity ∆ = T /n and strike price K = 1. From Proposition 1 we get the following corollary.
. Then π n rises in n,
i.e., π n+1 ≥ π n .
Proof: By Boyle and Scott (2006), the constraint on r gives a sufficient condition for C(y, 1) being increasing and concave in y for all y ∈ 0, T n . Let us set n = k and then, since π n is continuous in n, we have
where k ∈ {1, 2, ...}. The inequality holds because C(y, 1) is concave for all y ∈ 0, T k and, thus, we have
Corollary 1 is a sufficient condition for C(∆, 1) being increasing and concave for all ∆ ∈ 0, T n and this guarantees π n+1 ≥ π n . Even though it is possible to find parameter values, where C(∆, 1) is locally convex in ∆, 12 we have not found a case, where the result (π n+1 ≥ π n ) does not hold since this would require convexity for a wide range of ∆ values.
Since the compensation value is a portfolio of call options, the value rises in the levered volatility σ θ . That is, ∂πn ∂σ θ > 0 and, by Proposition 1 and Black and Scholes (1973), we get the formula for the bonus vega:
where
is standard normal density. Now we can state the following corollary that gives how the vega changes with respect to n.
Corollary 2 The sensitivity of the compensation value with respect to levered volatility σ θ rises in the number of periods n:
Proof: Since r > 0, σ θ > 0, and ∆ > 0, we have
This gives
By Corollary 2, the shorter the time period ∆ = T /n is, the stronger the effect of the levered volatility. This implies that bankers with short term compensation packages have a high incentive to increase leverage and/or their business risk. This is consistent with Gopalan et al. (2010; see prediction 2), who find out that the pay duration is shorter for firms with more volatile cash flows. Figure 1 illustrates the compensation value (Corollary 1) and risk-taking incentives (6), i.e., bonus vega (
) with respect to the number of compensation time periods for an example bank. Note that the higher the number, the shorter the compensation time interval ∆. As can be seen, both the compensation value and the vega are positive and increasing in the number of periods. Thus, by our model and the numerical example of Figure 1 , the higher the bonus payment frequency is, the higher the compensation value and the risk-taking incentives. However, vega is substantial only if the payment interval is shorter than one year; i.e., for n larger than 10. Figure 2 illustrates the compensation value and risk-taking incentives with respect to the levered volatility. As can be seen, the compensation value rises in the levered volatility, while the risk-taking incentive is low at very low volatility values but rises rapidly.
Compensation value with bonus cap
We next extend the model to include bonus cap. Let M be the bonus cap for each ∆-period, i.e., M is the maximum bonus during the ∆-period. Then from Proposition 1 we get the following result.
Corollary 3
The value of compensation package with n payout periods on [0, T ] and bonus cap M in each payout period is given bỹ
where ∆ = T /n, A(0) is initial net asset value, σ θ is the levered volatility, r is the risk-free rate, k is the fraction of profits paid out as compensation, {ε i } are independent standard normal variables, and C(∆, K) is the call option price in (4).
Proof: Let us consider i'th ∆-period. By (3) and the definition of bonus cap, if 
where χ = M/k and M is the maximum bonus during the ∆-period. 13 By Proposition 1, the compensation value is the sum of expected discounted payoffs:
which with iterated expectations, (2), and (4) gives the result.
Optimal risk level
In this section we solve the banker's optimal risk level by assuming that there is an increasing cost to risk-taking. The cost of risk-taking may arise from several sources such as market discipline, regulation, other forms of compensation such as equity, and the 13 Thus, when earnings A(i∆) − A((i − 1)∆) < χ then the bonus equals
and when earnings
banker's own career concerns as a result of poor performance or, ultimately, bankruptcy.
To understand the total effect of a policy change, both the cost of risk-taking and the bonus induced risk-taking incentives need to be considered. That is, so far in this paper we have focused on the incentives and in order to do the counterfactual analysis for changes in bonus regulation, we include the cost of risk-taking. In the current paper, we do not explicitly model the sources of the risk-taking costs, instead we use generic cost functions.
By (1), the banker takes risk with high leverage θ and/or with low asset quality, i.e., with high risky asset volatility σ. We assume that the risk-taking cost is a function of the levered volatility σ θ which is the measure of risk-taking in our model. Further, we assume a common form for the cost function but with individual cost parameters for each bank. Thus, given the bonus compensation, the banker's objective is to maximize the net value, i.e., the value of the compensation minus the cost:
where we wroteπ n,M explicitly as a function of levered volatility σ θ = (1 + θ)σ, ∆σ θ is the change of current σ θ , and F (·) is the cost of changing the levered volatility. The optimization constraint in (7) means that the levered volatility cannot be negative.
We use two alternative cost functions:
where c + and c − are cost parameters for volatility increase and decrease, and I{·} is an indicator function, i.e.,
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The higher the c + parameter is, the more the volatility increase is penalized. On the other hand, the smaller the c − parameter is, the less costly it is to reduce risk.
By our model, the total risk-taking incentive depends on the banker's compensation and the cost of risk-taking. Therefore, measures of compensation induced incentives alone do not predict the bank's risk level or changes of that. This is consistent with adequacy framework is an example of (ii) since the more a bank trades or, more specifically, the higher its trading book's value-at-risk is, the more it should finance itself with equity capital. Basel II's risk-weights represent an example of (iii) since lowering the risk-weights of certain asset classes rewards banks to hold more those assets. where the model optimal levered volatility is given by σ * n,M = σ θ + arg max and (v) simply repeat cases (ii) and (iii) by considering bonuses that are paid every fifth year. Note that regarding the implementation of the bonus deferral policy we assume that the bonus cap is calculated based on the cumulative base salary over the bonus payment interval; one, two or five years. Further, note that for simplicity we ignore salary rises.
In Section 6.1, we first discuss the data used to calibrate the model parameters, and then in Section 6.2 the results concerning cases (i) − (v) above and some further robustness checks are given. give the levered earnings volatility σ θ . Table 1 shows that the estimated levered earnings volatility for an average bank almost triples when we use data until 2008Q4 instead of 2006Q4, so including the crisis period constitutes an important robustness check.
Data
In the cost parameter estimation the ∆ parameter, measuring the payment interval of bonuses, is set at one year. Parameter T , the remaining tenure of the CEO is estimated by taking the minimum of 10 years and the difference between the CEO's retirement age and current age. The retirement age is assumed to be common for all CEOs in the sample and is proxied by the highest CEO age in the data, which is 77 years. Admittedly, this is a crude proxy with which we settled in the absence of more detailed information of individual CEO contracts. The cap of 10 years on the remaining CEO tenure is motivated by studies on average CEO tenures. 15 However, as a robustness check, we also calibrate the model by assuming a CEO tenure cap of 15 years. Tables 2 and 3 present the calibration results for the two alternative cost functions (F ), the two alternative estimation periods of the levered earnings volatility (σ θ ), and the two alternative assumptions concerning the CEO's maximum remaining tenure (cap on T ). By (9), the parameters are calculated by assuming that the historical estimate of σ θ is at optimal level for each bank. We note from Tables 2 and 3 that variation in the bank-specific cost parameters is very large in all cases considered. Further, we find that the cost parameters correlate positively with bank size. This indicates that large banks find it more difficult to change their risk level. However, explaining the bank level risktaking costs is beyond the scope of the present paper; instead, we focus on the effects of bonus deferrals and bonus caps on risk-taking incentives by taking the calibrated cost parameters as given. Table 4 presents the policy simulation results concerning the adjustment in banks' optimal risk level in response either to the bonus cap, bonus deferral, or both. Table 5 presents the corresponding set of results but with the levered earnings volatility estimation period including the crisis years 2007-2008. By Table 4 , the bonus cap reduces the average bank's risk level (σ θ ) by 16.32% for the linear cost function and by 24.65% for the quadratic cost function, while the longer bonus payment interval, even the five-year case, has no visible effect on the bankers' actions in our sample. The bank-specific variation in the adjustment is very large, ranging from zero effect to roughly 99% reduction in risk level. When the bonus cap and the longer payment interval are considered jointly, Table 4 shows that in this case the risk level is in actuality reduced somewhat less than in the case in which the bonus cap is the only restriction. This difference results from the fact that multiplying the bonus cap when moving to the every second (or every fifth)
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year bonus payment constitutes a somewhat milder bonus restriction than the one-year bonus cap. In Table 5 we obtain qualitatively the same but somewhat more pronounced results which are due to the higher bank-specific earnings volatility estimates. In this case the bonus cap reduces the average bank's risk level (σ θ ) by 21.84% for the linear cost function and by 27.85% for the quadratic cost function, while the longer bonus payment interval still has no visible effect on any of the banks. Note that, by Tables 4   and 5 , these findings are also robust with respect to the tenure cap.
As a further robustness check, Table 6 presents results corresponding to Table 4 but by counting in the entire variable pay of the CEO, i.e., augmenting the cash bonus with option and stock grants. We consider two versions, either including restricted stocks (Panels A and B in Table 6 ) or excluding them (Panels C and D). By Table 1 , the total variable pay as a ratio of net income, i.e., the model parameter k, is roughly 2 to 4 times larger than when only cash bonuses are considered. As our theoretical model considers only cash bonuses, in Table 6 we implicitly assume that the other forms of variable pay can be converted immediately to cash. In other words, we ignore the specific incentive effects arising from, e.g., vesting periods of option and stock grants. Interestingly, when we calculate k by including all forms of variable pay (see Panel B in Table 1) , we obtain not only the highest but also the most stable estimate of k in our data over the years [2004] [2005] [2006] . Correspondingly to the k parameters in Panels B and C of Table 1, we estimate new cost parameters c + and c − by using (9) . Due to the higher k values in Panels B and C, the cost parameters are naturally higher (not reported for brevity). The risk reduction results in Table 6 are well in line with those of Table 4 , but even stronger. To further illustrate the economic significance of the risk reduction achieved by the bonus cap that equals the base salary, suppose a representative bank reduces its risk level by 20% which is roughly supported by our primary results in Table 4 . Suppose further that the bank does that solely by reducing its leverage. Assume the bank's earnings volatility is 0.0012 and its original debt to equity ratio is 96 to 4 so that its equity is at 4%. This would imply that the bank would increase its equity to 5%. This is not an insignificant change, but hardly alone accounting for the magnitude that regulators are currently targeting. Therefore, a bonus cap should be seen as a complementary tool to control banks' riskiness but not the only one (as is indeed the case in the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III). Of course, our results suggest that for some banks the effect of the bonus cap is much stronger in terms of leverage decrease.
Next we take a closer look at the bank-specific risk reductions achieved by the bonus cap. Table 11 depicts in the last column the risk reduction for each individual bank in our sample, where the risk reduction is taken as the average per bank over 24 different cases in Tables 4 and 5 . 16 We can see that the well-known troubled banks during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 that are included in our sample, such as Washington Mutual and Wachovia, are in the upper part of the list with substantial risk reductions predicted by our counterfactual analysis. Table 11 also depicts in the first column the total assets as a measure of bank size. Because bank size has a relatively high correlation with the cost of risk-taking (see Tables 2 and 3) , it is interesting to see whether the banks' risk reduction is also related to the bank size. We study this in Tables 7 and 8 . The results show that bank size, when measured as the logarithm of total assets, is positively related to the risk reduction and this relationship is statistically significant especially under the quadratic cost function. This may result from larger banks having higher risk-taking incentives, at least partly, due to the higher risk-taking costs, so that the bonus cap has the largest effect on them. Or it could be that large banks impose a high risk-taking incentive on their CEOs because their equity holders prefer higher risk due to too-big-to-fail status and the resulting implicit government subsidy to their debt. These explanations are consistent with the relatively high positive correlation between the cost parameters and the vega (see Tables 2 and 3 ). Because the largest banks are typically the most crucial for financial stability (see Laeven et al. 2014) , it is an important finding that the bonus cap would seem to have the biggest bite on their risk-taking.
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It is an important and also unexpected finding that bonus deferrals have so small effect on risk reduction according to our model. This can be seen from Figures 1 and 3: bonus cap changes the vega of the example bank substantially but the bonus frequency has only effect if bonuses are paid more frequently than annually, i.e., more frequently than currently without the bonus regulation. That is, the current annual bonus frequency does not raise the example bank's risk-taking incentives. However, since some non-banks receive performance fee quarterly or even monthly, the bonus frequency might affect their risk-taking.
Our results also suggest that while the European Union's bonus cap seems to be effective, the Dodd-Frank Act's intention to tackle excessive bonuses with potential clawbacks may be ineffective in curbing excessive risk-taking ex ante. The latter implication is based on our bonus deferral results. 18 However, the Dodd-Frank bonus clawbacks are mainly targeted at discouraging misbehaviour, and, accordingly, may be activated only when losses result from misconduct. Hence, as losses occur also in the normal course of 17 We also tested whether risk reduction is related to bank stock performance during the crisis, or its product with the bank size, which establishes a crude measure of a bank's systemic risk. However, these variables do not add robust explanatory power over and above the bank size, although some of these measures are significant especially when we include the crisis period in the levered volatility estimation; see Tables 7 -10 . 18 The following simple example shows that bonus deferrals provide a fair proxy for the clawbacks. Suppose a bank made a positive profit in year t and paid bonuses. Then in year t + 1 its profits and share price plummet because of materialized risks taken in year t. Hence, no bonus is paid in year t + 1, and also bonuses paid in t are clawed back. Similar outcome would result if bonuses were paid only every second year under a bonus deferral.
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risk-taking without any misconduct, our analysis with the bonus deferrals can be viewed as an upper limit of the impact of bonus clawbacks on risk-taking. Further, since we found no risk reduction due to the bonus deferrals, we expect the same for the clawbacks.
Conclusions
In this paper we have modeled future bonuses as a series of sequential call options on profits and show that if the cost of risk-taking is ignored bonuses provide the higher risktaking incentive the shorter is the time between the bonus determination time points and the higher are the bonuses relative to the fixed pay. Then bankers' total risk-taking incentive is a joint effect of compensation and risk-taking costs. We calibrate our model to a sample of US banks and their CEOs' bonuses and show that increasing the effective bonus payment interval to two years from the standard one year has no material effect on risk-taking. However, the relationship between bonus payment interval and risk-taking is nonlinear in a way that lengthening the bonus payment interval would start to have an effect if the original interval were less than one year. Further, capping the bonus to be no larger than fixed salary -an equivalent of the new EU regulation -significantly reduces banks' risk level. The mean risk reduction of the banks is 16-48% depending on the specific calibration. The bank-specific effect varies widely and we find some evidence that the bonus cap is most effective in larger banks. On balance, our results suggest that the European Union's bonus cap is effective in reining in risk-taking whereas bonus clawbacks (cf. bonus deferrals in our model) included in the US Dodd-Frank Act seem ineffective. Table 1 ). Piecewise linear cost function:
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Appendix B: Tables
2 . Bank size is defined as the natural logarithm of the total asset at 2006Q4. All the correlations are significant at 0.01% level. 
Cost function
Bank size is defined as the natural logarithm of the total asset at 2006Q4. All the correlations are significant at 0.01% level. (9), we get the parameters of the cost functions, see Table 2 . Piecewise linear cost function: Table 5 : Statistics for risk reduction in terms of proportional decrease in optimal levered volatility (σ * n,M
in ( (9), we get the parameters of the cost functions, see Table 3 . Piecewise linear cost function: Table 6 : Statistics for risk reduction in terms of proportional decrease in optimal levered volatility (σ * n,M in (8)) due to bonus cap (M ) and longer bonus interval (∆) under different cost functions (linear and quadratic) and maximum CEO tenure (cap on T ) when the initial levered volatility (σ * T,∞ ) is the levered volatility in 2006 and when option and stock grants are included (k in Panels B and C of Table 1 (9), we get the parameters of the piecewise linear and quadratic cost functions (not reported for brevity). 31 Dec 2008 , and systemic risk is defined as the product of bank size and stock crisis return. The regression models: reduction of levered volatility = α + β 1 · bank size + β 2 · crisis return + β 3 · systemic risk + error. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Number of observations in all the regression models is 75. Table 8 
